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for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von
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INTRODUCTION
The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem is one of the most fundamen-
tal results of the theory of individual decision making. It shows that a preference rela-
tion defined on a lottery space has an expected utility representation, provided that it is
a complete and transitive binary relation that satisfies the standard independence and
continuity axioms. Given the importance of this result, it is not surprising that there is a
large number of studies that investigate its alterations which arise due to the relaxation
of its various postulates. However, only few of these studies focus on the completeness
assumption; it is presently not known if there is a reasonable way of modifying the
expected utility theorem to include incomplete preferences within its coverage. Our
objective is to offer a remedy for this situation.
We study axiomatically the problem of obtaining an expected utility representationEXPECTED UTILITY THEORY WITHOUT THE COMPLETENESS AXIOM
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Before stating more carefully our goal and the contribution thereof, let us note that there
are several economic reasons why one would like to study incomplete preference rela-
tions. First of all, as advanced by several authors in the literature, it is not evident if
completeness is a fundamental rationality tenet the way the transitivity property is.
Aumann (1962), Bewley (1986) and Mandler (1999), among others, defend this posi-
tion very strongly from both the normative and positive viewpoints. Indeed, if one takes
the psychological preference approach (which derives choices from preferences), and
not the revealed preference approach, it seems natural to define a preference relation as
a potentially incomplete preorder, thereby allowing for the occasional “indecisiveness”
of the agents. Secondly, there are economic instances in which a decision maker is in
fact composed of several agents each with a possibly distinct objective function. For
instance, in coalitional bargaining games, one may choose to specify the preferences of
each coalition by means of a vector of utility functions (one for each member of the
coalition); thereby rendering the preference relation of each coalition incomplete. The
same reasoning applies to social choice problems; after all, the most commonly used
social welfare ordering in economics, the Pareto dominance, is an incomplete preorder.
Finally, we note that incomplete preferences allow one to complement the decision
making process of the agents by providing room for introducing to the model important
behavioral traits like status quo bias, loss aversion, procedural decision making, etc.
(cf. Mandler (1999) and Dubra and Ok (2001)).
Since these issues are discussed at length in the literature, we shall not discuss the
potential importance of incomplete preferences for economic modeling at large, but
rather proceed to discuss how one may handle the problem of actually representing
such preferences.1 Curiously, the basic idea has already been suggested, albeit elusively,
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, pp. 19-20):
“... We have conceded that one may doubt whether a person can always decide which of two
alternatives ... he prefers. If the general comparability assumption is not made, a mathematical
theory ... is still possible. It leads to what may be described as a many-dimensional vector
concept of utility. This is a more complicated and less satisfactory set-up, but we do not propose
to treat it systematically at this time.” 2
In evaluation of this statement, Aumann (1962, p. 449) notes that “... Details were never
published. What they probably had in mind was some kind of mapping from the space
of lotteries to a canonical partially ordered euclidean space, ... but it is not clear to me
1 A closely related issue was studied by Aumann (1962) and Kannai (1963). These authors were interested in
finding an extension of an incomplete preference relation defined over lotteries that admits an expected
utility representation. Unfortunately, as also noted by Majumdar and Sen (1976), this approach falls short of
yielding a representation theorem, for it does not characterize the preference relations under consideration.
Put differently, the Aumann-Kannai approach fails to capture the indecisiveness region of an individual, and
hence provides only partial information about the associated choice behavior. More on this in Remark 2
below.
2 Also quoted in Aumann (1962) and Vind (2000).JUAN DUBRA / FABIO MACCHERONI / EFE A. OK
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how this approach can be worked out.” Our objective here is actually nothing other than
formalizing Aumann’s interpretation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern suggestion.
    To make things a bit more precise, let us denote by X the set of certain prizes, and con-
sider a preference relation % which is defined as a (potentially incomplete) preorder on the
set of all lotteries on X. It is obvious that one cannot represent % in the standard way by
using a single von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, if % is actually incomplete. But
one may do so by means of a set of utility functions defined on X. Thus the representation
notion we suggest requires one to come up with a set U of real functions on X such that, for
all lotteries p and q,
p % q if and only if Ep(u) ¸ Eq(u) for all u 2U
where Er(u) stands for the expectation of u with respect to the lottery r = p,q. We are,
then, interested in obtaining an expected multi-utility representation for incomplete pref-
erence relations. This seems to correspond well to the intuition indicated in the von
Neumann-Morgenstern and Aumann quotations given above.
A close relative of the above representation concept is actually suggested also by Shapley
and Baucells (1998) (see Remark 3 below), and is studied in the context of utility theory
under certainty by Ok (2001). This concept clearly carries a stochastic dominance fla-
vor, and hence brings the expected utility theory one step closer to the theory of stochas-
tic orders.3 More generally, this particular formulation of utility representation ties the
expected utility theory to the theory of multi-objective decision making. While this link
is often suggested to motivate the study of incomplete preferences (as in the coalitional
bargaining example), an axiomatization of the representation we suggest here will clearly
make the connection a concrete one. What is more, such an axiomatization sheds light
into the role of the completeness assumption in the classical expected utility theorem.
For all practical purposes, our approach shows precisely how this theorem modifies in
the absence of the completeness axiom.
Put concretely, we focus in this paper on the case in which X is a compact metric space,
and prove that the standard independence axiom and a mild strengthening of the stan-
dard continuity property suffice to yield an expected multi-utility representation in terms
of continuous utility functions. In the sequel, we shall also determine in what sense
such a representation may be regarded as unique, show how it can be strengthened in
the case of monetary lotteries, demonstrate that it can be used to complete a preference
3 In fact, the preorders that admit such a vector-valued representation are called integral stochastic orders
(Whitt, 1986), and have been studied extensively in the literature on applied probability; see, inter alia,
Mosler and Scarsini (1994) - which is an annotated bibliography -, Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994), and
Müller (1997). To the best of our knowledge, however, the integral stochastic orders are so far not investi-
gated axiomatically.EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY WITHOUT THE COMPLETENESS AXIOM
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relation in the sense of Aumann (1962), and discuss the potential difficulties in extend-
ing the present approach to a more general class of prize spaces.
EXPECTED MULTI-UTILITY REPRESENTATION
We take an arbitrary compact metric space X as the set of all certain prizes (degenerate
lotteries), and let C(X) stand for the set of all continuous real maps on X, respectively.
The set of all Borel probability measures (lotteries) over X, endowed with the topology
of weak convergence, is denoted by P(X).4
We define a preference relation as any reflexive and transitive binary relation on P(X).
This should be contrasted with the standard theory in which a preference relation is
assumed also to be complete. To stress this point, we note that the first order stochastic
dominance ordering (defined on R) is a preference relation in the general sense of the
term adopted here, while this is not the case in the standard theory.
The two fundamental postulates of the expected utility theory are the independence and
the continuity axioms which we state formally next.
 
ndependence Axiom. For any p,q,r 2P(X) and any ¸ 2 (0;1);
p % q implies ¸p +( 1¡ ¸)r % ¸q +( 1¡ ¸)r:
I
ontinuity Axiom.5 For any convergent sequences (pn) and (qn) in P(X),
pn % qn for all n imply limpn % limqn:
C
While the significance of incomplete preference relations is noted in the literature, a
definitive expected utility representation for such preorders does not seem to be agreed
upon. Given the well-known characterization of the stochastic dominance orderings in
4 For concreteness, we recall that, under this topology, a sequence (pn) in P(X) converges to p 2P(X) if and only
if
R
X fdpn !
R
X fdp for all f 2 C(X):
Intheliteraturethefollowingweakerpropertyissometimesused(Grandmont(1972)):Forall the q2P(X),
paper can be proved with this weaker continuity condition, except in the case where is a finite set.
Conceptuallyspeaking,however,thereisevidentlylittledifferencebetweenthetwocontinuityconditions.
In fact, some textbooks (such as Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), p. 46) "define" the continuity
axiomforanarbitrarypreferencerelationonatopologicalspacepreciselyaswedohere.
X
sets and are closed in We do not know if the main theorem of this P(X). fg pp q : % fg pqp : %
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terms of linear functionals that possess an expected utility form, we would like to pro-
pose here a multi-utility representation for such a preorder. Put more precisely, we seek
here a set U of utility functions on X such that
p % q if and only if
Z
X
udp ¸
Z
X
udq for all u 2U (1)
for all p,q ∈ P(X). As discussed above, this is a somewhat natural notion of an integral
multi-utility representation which appears suitable for applications. It can be viewed as
a reflection of the theory of decision making with non-unique priors (under subjective
uncertainty). Loosely stated, in this theory, one compares horse race lotteries by means
of taking expectations of a single utility function with respect to a set of probability
measures (see Bewley (1986) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), whereas in our set-
ting of objective uncertainty, one compares objective lotteries by means of taking ex-
pectations of a set of utility functions with respect to the given lotteries.
The main result of this paper states that any preference relation that satisfies the inde-
pendence and continuity axioms admits an expected multi-utility representation, pro-
vided that the prize space X is compact. This result is proved next.
Expected Multi-Utility Theorem. Let X be a compact metric space, and let % be a prefer-
ence relation on P(X).  % satisfies the independence and continuity axioms if and only if
there exists a closed and convex set U ⊆ C (X) such that (1) holds for each p,q ∈ P(X).
Proof. See appendix.
We now turn to generalize the uniqueness part of the classic expected utility theorem in
our multi-utility context. This generalization can in fact be carried out in an arbitrary
(not necessarily compact) metric space X, provided that the utility functions are chosen
from Cb(X), the set of all continuous and bounded real functions on X. The upshot is that
if the sets U and V  in Cb (X) represent a preference relation % as in (1), then V  must
belong to the closed convex cone generated by U and all constant functions; this is the
content of the forthcoming uniqueness theorem.6,7
Clearly, a special case of this observation is the standard uniqueness result of expected
utility theory.
To state formally our general uniqueness result on the set-valued expected utility repre-
sentations, we define the operator h¢i :2 Cb(X) ! 2Cb(X) as
hUi := cl(cone(U)+fµ1Xgµ2R);
6 A number of versions and special cases of this result have actually been noted elsewhere in the literature;
see, for instance, Müller (1997), Castagnoli and Maccheroni (1998), and Dubra and Ok (2001).
7 In this paper by a convex cone (in any vector space) we mean a nonempty convex set that is closed under
nonnegative scalar multiplication. For any set A, cone(A) stands for the smallest convex cone that contains
A.EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY WITHOUT THE COMPLETENESS AXIOM
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where the closure operator is applied with respect to the weak topology on Cb (X) (or
equivalently, with respect to the sup-norm topology when X is compact). It is easy to
verify that if U represents %, so does <U >. The following result tells us further that <U
> is in fact the largest set of utility functions in Cb (X) that represents % as in (1). This
observation can be viewed as a general uniqueness theorem for expected multi-utility
representations.
Uniqueness Theorem. Let X be a metric space. Two nonempty sets U and V  in Cb (X)
satisfy, for each p, q∈P(X),
Z
X
udp ¸
Z
X
udq for all u 2U if and only if
Z
X
vdp ¸
Z
X
vdq
and only if hUi = hVi: if
for a v 2V; ll
Proof. See appendix.
We conclude the present discussion with a number of complementary comments.
Remark 1. (Preferences over Monetary Lotteries) An important special case of the presente
setup which is widely used in applications is the case of monetary lotteries where X  is a
closed interval in the real line, say,  X  = [0,1]. Since in this case it is natural to incorporate
the idea that “more money is preferred to less”, one should examine the structure of the
preference relations % on P[0,1] such that p ÂFSD  q implies p Â q for all p, q ∈ P(X), where
ÂFSD is the irreflexive part of the first order stochastic dominance relation ÂFSD on P[0,1].
The question is then to determine the structure of preferences that satisfy not only the axi-
oms of independence and continuity, but also this monotonicity condition. To answer this
question let us agree to call a set U in Rx strictly increasing, if each u ∈ U  is  weakly
increasing, and if  < ¸ 0 ab1 implies u(( ) a) <u ¸ b for some u ∈ U. The following is an
important corollary of our main representation theorem.
Expected Multi-Utility Theorem on P[0,1]. Let % be a preference relation on P[0,1]. %
satisfies the independence, continuity and monotonicity axioms if, and only if, there exists a
strictly increasing closed an convex set UµC[0;1] such that (1) holds for each p;q 2 : P[0;1]
Given the general expected multi-utility theorem we have proved above, all we need to do here
is to verify the monotonicity of a preference relation % for which there exists a strictly increasing
in C[0;1] such that (1) holds for each p;q 2P[0;1]: Take any p;q 2P [0;1] w U FSD q. Then ith p Â
F¡1
p >F¡1
q ; that is, F¡1
p (s) ¸ F¡1
q (s) for all s 2 (0;1) and F¡1
p (s¤) >F¡1
q (s¤) for some s¤ 2 (0;1):8
The pseudoinverse distribution function of a probability measure p 2P [0;1] is defined by F
¡1
p (s): =
min ft 2 [0;1] : p([0;t]) ¸ sg for all s 2 (0;1): It is easily checked to be increasing and left continuous. Moreover,
pseudounverses display these two useful features:( i )
R
[0;1] udp =
R 1
0 u
¡
F
¡1
p (s)
¢
ds for all u 2 C[0;1], and (ii) p %FSD q
iffF
¡1
p ¸ F
¡1
q .
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Since U is strictly increasing, there exists a u* ∈ U such that u* 
¡
F¡1
p (s¤)
¢
>u ¤ ¡
F¡1
q (s¤)
¢
, so
that u¤ ± F¡1
p >u ¤ ± F¡1
q . But u¤ ± F¡1
p and u¤ ± F¡1
q , are left continuous, and hence
Z
[0;1]
u¤dp =
Z 1
0
u¤¡
F¡1
p (s)
¢
ds >
Z 1
0
u¤ ¡
F¡1
q (s)
¢
ds =
Z
[0;1]
u¤dq:
Moreover (since U consists of increasing functions) 
R
[0;1]udp ¸
R
[0;1] udq for all u 2U . Hence
we may conclude that p Â q II
Remark 2. (The Extension Approach) As noted in the Introduction, earlier studies on
relaxing the completeness axiom within the paradigm of expected utility have focused
on the problem of extending a preference relation that satisfies the independence and
(various forms of) the continuity axioms in such a way that the extended relation admits
a von Neumann-Morgenstern representation. The important work of Aumann (1962),
in particular, is geared towards finding a function u : X → R, referred to as an Aumann
utility below, such that
p Â (∼)q implies
Z
X
udp > (=)
Z
X
udq
for all p, q § P(X). A major disadvantage of this approach is that one cannot recover the
preference relation % from its Aumann utility. So, in contrast to U in (1), the informa-
tion contained in an Aumann utility for % is strictly less than %. Maximization of an
expected Aumann utility on a given constraint set S leads to a %-maximal element in S,
whereas the vector-maximization of all expected members of U leads to the set of all %-
maximal elements in S.
    It is, however, still worth knowing if an Aumann utility exists in the present context.
Fortunately, mostly because we work with a continuity condition stronger than that
adopted by Aumann, the answer is yes.9
Theorem. Let X be a compact metric space, and let % be a preference relation on P(X).
If  % satisfies the independence and continuity axioms, then it must possess a continuous
Aumann utility.
9 This is perhaps somewhat surprising, because one major message of Aumann (1962) is that an expected
utility theory without the completeness axiom cannot be pursued along the extension approach, when X is
infinite. However, since Aumann’s related example does not work for a space of lotteries (it is proved in the
mixture space R∞), there is reason to believe that the said message is in fact overly pessimistic. What is more,
with a slight strengthening of the continuity axiom (as adopted here), both the extension and the multi-utility
approaches stand strong, at least in the case of lotteries defined over an arbitrary compact metric space.EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY WITHOUT THE COMPLETENESS AXIOM
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To prove this, we apply the expected multi-utility theorem to find a set U in C(X) such that
(1) holds for all p, q § P(X). Thanks to the Weierstrass theorem, it is without loss of gener-
ality to assume that u ≥ 0 for all u § U. Since X is compact, C (X) is separable, and hence U.
is itself a separable metric space. Let {À1,À2,...} be a dense set in U. It is readily verified that
Z
X
Z
X
p % q if and only if vndp ¸ vndq for all n =1 ;2;:::
Let un := 2¡n vn
kvnk +1
for each n,a nd observe that
Z
X
p % q if and only if undp ¸ undq for all n =1 ;2;:::
Define w :=
P1un 2 C (X), and take any p;q 2P(X): It is obvious that p » q im R
X wdq: On the other hand, by (2), p Â q implies that there exists a positive integ
R
X uNdp >
R
X uNdq while
R
X undp ¸
R
X undq for all n: Therefore, by the monoto
theorem,
µ¶ µ¶ Z
X
(
P
un)dp =
P
Z
X
undp >
P
Z
X
undq =
Z
X
(
P
un)dq;
that is,
R
X wdp >
R
X wdq. Thus, w is a continuous Aumann utility for %. k
e
n
plies
R
X wdp =
rNs u c ht h a t
e convergence
Z
X
Remark 3. (The Algebraic Approach) Despite the quotation by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) mentioned in the Introduction, a notion of expected utility representation by means of a set
of utility functions has, to the best of our knowledge, not been studied in the literature so far.
However, we should note that Shapley and Baucells (1998) advance a representation notion which
actually admits the corresponding notion we introduced here as a special case. These authors
identify conditions for a preference relation % on P(X)  (actually on an arbitrary mixture space) to
have a representation of the form
  p % q if and only if T(p) ¸ T(q) for all T 2
where Ω is a nonempty set of affine functionals on P(X). The approach of Shapley and
Baucells contrasts with the present one in that it is algebraic as opposed to topological.
While penetrating, it is as such not immediately useful in dealing with the problem of
expected multi-utility representation of incomplete preferences. The main difficulty
with the approach is that it is not clear if and when the functionals T in Ω do possess an
expected-utility form. 10  The second major difficulty is that the Shapley-Baucells ap-
10 More precisely, the problem is that it is not clear when each T can be chosen to be continuous in the weak*-
topology (or put differently, when C(%) can be expressed as an intersection of half spaces the corresponding
hyperplanes of which are not dense in ca(X)). While this may sound like a technical concern at first, it should be
noted that, without this issue being resolved, the Shapley-Baucells approach does not yield an expected utility
theorem.JUAN DUBRA / FABIO MACCHERONI / EFE A. OK
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proach does not function only in terms of the classical assumptions of independence
and continuity, but it is, in addition, based on a crucial “properness” assumption which
ensures that the cone C(%) has a nonempty algebraic interior by definition. Unfortu-
nately, it is not at all easy to see what sort of a primitive axiom on a preference relation
would support such a technical requirement. II
Remark 4. (Larger Classes of Prize Spaces) While our main representation theorem is
strong enough to cover many cases of interest, it does not function in the general do-
main that the classical expected utility theorem functions, namely, for preferences de-
fined over lotteries on an arbitrary Polish (i.e. complete and separable metric) space.
Whether our result can be extended to this general domain is presently an open techni-
cal problem. It may be worth noting that the main difficulty on this regard is that, when
X is not compact, the “natural” topologies on Cb(X) and ca(X) (induced by the dual pair
structure (Cb(X),ca(X)) under the duality map (f, µ) 7!
R
X fd¹) differs from the stan-
dard weak and weak*- topologies (induced by the sup-norm). This, in turn, invalidates
the arguments given in the key step (Claim 4) of the proof of our main theorem; in
particular, the Krein-Šmulian theorem does not apply in this context. II
APPENDIX
We now present the proofs of the main results of this note. We let ca(X) stand for the set
of all finite Borel signed measures on X, that is,
ca(X) := span (P(X)).
It is well known that when X is compact, ca(X) (normed by the total variation norm) is
isometrically isomorphic to the topological dual of C(X) (normed by the sup-norm).
Using this duality, we shall consider ca(X) in this paper as endowed with the weak*-
topology.11  It is worth noting that this weak*- topology on ca(X) induces on the set of
lotteries P(X) the standard topology of weak convergence for probability measures, as
was assumed.
Proof of the Expected Multi-utility Theorem. The necessity of the axioms for the rep-
resentation is easy to verify; we shall rather focus here on their sufficiency. Let % satisfy
the independence and continuity axioms. The idea of the proof stems from the follow-
ing two elementary observations.12
11 For concreteness, we recall that, under this topology, an e t(¹®) in ca(X) converges to ¹ 2 ca(X) if and only if
R
X fd¹® !
R
X fd¹ for all f 2 C(X):
12 Both of these observations were noted first in an unpublished paper by Shapley and Baucells (1998). We
include their proofs here for completeness.EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY WITHOUT THE COMPLETENESS AXIOM
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The importance of this set stems from the following observation.13
Claim 3. C(%) is a convex cone in ca(X) such that p % q if and only if p - q ∈ C (%).
Proof of Claim 3. While that C(%) is a cone is trivial, its convexity follows from the
independence axiom; we omit the routine details. The second claim is, on the other
hand, an immediate consequence of Claim 2. II
Applying Claim 1, p % q obtains. The converse claim is trivial. k
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 Le pq2P (X) and ¸ 2 (0 1] be such that ¸p +( 1¡ ¸)r % . ;
Let
¹ ® := supf® 2 [0;1] : ®p +( 1¡ ®)r % ®q +( 1¡ ®)rg:
Clearly ¹ ® ¸ ¸>0. Using the continuity of % it is easily verifi… ed that
¹ ®p +(1¡ ¹ ®)r% ¹ ®q +(1¡ ¹ ®)r: Now set ¯ :=
1
1+¹ ®
and observe that the
independence axiom yields
¯ (¹ ®p +( 1¡ ¹ ®)r)+( 1¡ ¯)p % ¯ (¹ ®q +( 1¡ ¹ ®)r)+( 1¡ ¯)p = ¯ (¹ ®p +( 1¡ ¹ ®)
% ¯ (¹ ®q +( 1¡ ¹ ®)r)+( 1¡ ¯)q
so that
2¹ ®
1+¹ ®
p+
1 ¡ ¹ ®
1+¹ ®
r %
2¹ ®
1+¹ ®
q+
1 ¡ ¹ ®
1+¹ ®
r: But by definition of ¹ ®,
2¹ ®
1+¹ ®
¹ ®, that
Since ¹ ®>0, therefore, we have ¹ ® =1 , and hence the previous observation gives p %
r)+( 1¡ ¯)q
is, ¹ ®2¡¹ ® ¸ 0.
q. k
Claim 2. For any pq2P(X); we have p % q if, and only if, there exist a ¸>0 a
with r % s and p¡ q = ¸(r ¡s):
Proof of Claim 2 Take any ¸>0 and rs2P (X) such that r % s and p ¡ . ;
Observe that the independence axiom gives
Claim 1. For any pq2 and any ¸ 2 (0;1], ¸p +( 1¡ ¸)r % ¸q +( 1¡ ¸)r implies p % q.
¸q +( 1¡ ¸)r
nd rs2P(X)
q = ¸(r ¡ s):
1
1+¸
p +
¸
1+¸
s =
1
1+¸
q +
¸
1+¸
r %
1
1+¸
q +
¸
1+¸
s:
Now define
C(%): =f¸(p ¡ q):¸>0 and p % qg:
, P() X
¸
,,
.
13 We note that the significance of the set C(%) for expected utility theory without the completeness axiom was
observed first by Aumann (1962). Like that of Aumann, the primary element of the approach we adopt here
is the investigation of the geometry of C(%). This approach is also adopted by a number of authors in the
literature, among which are Kannai (1963), Fishburn (1975), Bewley (1986), Shapley and Baucells (1998),
and Vind (2000).JUAN DUBRA / FABIO MACCHERONI / EFE A. OK
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The following claim provides the key step of the proof.
Claim 4. C (%) is weak*-closed.
Proof of Claim 4. We shall first show that C (%) is sequentially weak*-closed. Take then a
sequence (¸n (pn – qn)) in C(%), and assume that (¸n (pn - qn)) converges in ca(X) in the
weak*-topology. Then, by definition, 
R
X fd(¸n(pn ¡ qn)) must be a convergent real se-
quence for all ƒ ∈ C(X), which implies that supf
R
X fd(¸n(pn ¡ qn)) : n =1 ;2;:::g  is
finite. By the Banach-Steinhaus theorem, therefore, there exists a real number K such
that
k¸n(pn ¡ qn)k K; n =1 ;2;::: ¸
Now, by using the Jordan decomposition theorem, we can write pn – qn = °n (rn – wn) for
two mutually singular rn,wn ∈ P(X) such that rn % wn and °n ≥ 0. By mutual singularity,
II rn – wn II 2. But then
k¸n(pn ¡ qn)k = k¸n°n(rn ¡ wn)k = ¸n°n k(rn ¡ wn)k =2 ¸n°n
so that, by (3), we may conclude that (¸n°n) is a real sequence that lies in the closed
interval [0, K/2]. This sequence must then have a convergent subsequence (¸nk°nk). But
since X is compact, P(X ) is weak* -compat set in ca(X), and hence both (rnk) and (wnk)
must have (weak*-) convergent subsequences. 14 Passing to these subsequences con-
secutively, we end up with convergent subsequences (¸nkt°nkt); (rnkt), and (wnkt). Let us
write ¸nkt°nkt ! ¸; rnkt ! p and wnkt ! q as t !1 . By continuity of  %, we have p %  q.
Moreover,
¸nkt(pnkt ¡ qnkt)=( ¸nkt°nkt)(rnkt ¡ wnkt) ! ¸(p ¡ q)
as t !1 . Since every subsequence of a convergent sequence converges to the limit of
the mother sequence, we must then have lim ¸n(pn ¡ qn)=¸(p ¡ q) 2C (%), and hence we
may conclude that C(%) is sequientially weak*-closed.
Since X is compact, C(X) is separable, and ca(X) is equal (i.e., isometrically isomor-
phic) to the topological dual of C(X). But by the Krein-Šmulian theorem every sequen-
tially weak* -closed convex set in the dual of a separable normed space is weak*-
closed.15 Consequently, the previous observation implies that C(%) is weak*-closed in
ca(X). II
14 Since the weak* -topology on P(X) is identical to the standard topology of weak convergence on P(X),
weak* -compactness of P(X) is an immediate consequence of the Prohorov theorem. Alternatively, one can
supply a nonprobabilistic proof by using Alaoglu’s theorem.
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         We are now prepared to prove the theorem. Define
V :=
½
u 2 C(X):
Z
X
ud¹ ¸ 0 for all ¹ 2C (%)
¾
which is clearly nonempty. If p % q, then p - q ∈ C (%) so that ƒX  udp ≥ ƒX udq for all u
∈V . To establish the converse, take any p’  and q’ in P(X) with
Z
X
udp0 ¸
Z
X
udq0 for all u 2V,
and assume that p’ % q’ does not hold. This means that the sets {p’- q’} and C (%) are
disjoint. Since C (%) is a weak*-closed convex cone, then, by the Hahn-Banach separa-
tion theorem, there exists a continuous linear T on ca(X) and a real α such that T (µ) ≥
α > T(p’- q’) for all µ∈C (%).16 Since 0 ∈ C(%), we have 0 = T(0) ≥ α so that 0 > T (p’-
q’). Moreover, since C (%) is a cone, we have mT(µ) = T(mµ) ≥ α for any µ ∈ C(%) and
m ∈ N. This implies that T(µ) ≥ 0 for all µ ∈ C (%).17 That is, T(µ) ≥ 0 > T (p’- q’) for all
µ ∈ C (%). Since T is linear and continuous in the weak*-topology, there exists a À ∈ C
(X) such that T (µ) = 
R
X vdµ for all µ∈ca(X).18 Thus, we have
Z
X
vd¹ ¸ 0 >
Z
X
vd
¡
p0 ¡ q0¢
for all ¹ 2C (%).
This means that v ∈ V  and 
R
X vdp’ < 
R
X vdq’, which is a contradiction. Setting U : =
cl(co(V )), therefore, completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of the Uniqueness Theorem. Since the “if” part is trivial, we shall prove here
only the “only if” part. Suppose that we can find a À ∈ Cb(X) such that À  ∈ hVinhUi.
Endowing Cb(X) with the weak topology, we may apply the separating hyperplane theo-
rem to find a nonzero signed measure µ ∈ ca(X) such that
Z
X
vd¹ > 0 ¸
Z
X
ud¹ for all u 2h Ui:
The latter inequalities imply that 0 ≥ 
R
X µ1Xd¹ = µ¹(X) for all real θ, and hence we
have µ(X) = 0. Of course, we have µ = µ+- µ-  for some finite Borel measures µ+ and µ-
16 See Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 5.58.
17 The last three sentences and the geometric form of the Hahn-Banach theorem show that a closed convex
cone can be strictly separated from a point in its exterior by a closed hyperplane which passes through the
origin. We shall use this form of the separating hyperplane theorem also in the uniqueness theorem that
follows.
18 See Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 5.83, p. 208.JUAN DUBRA / FABIO MACCHERONI / EFE A. OK
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on X. By the previous observation, µ+(X) = µ-  (X) = c ≥ 0. Since c = 0 would imply that
µ = 0, we must actually have c > 0. Thus p: = µ+/ c and q : = µ- /c belong to P(X). So, by
(4), we get 
R
X Àdp > 
R
X Àdq and  
R
X udp ≥ 
R
X udq for all u ∈ (U), which is a contradic-
tion. Q.E.D.
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